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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA ANN FARLEY,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

v.

Civil No.
10567

ROSS E. FARLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent
facts as related
incomplete and
for the court to
follows:

is of the opinion that the statement of
by the defendant-appellant is extremely
unilateral in presentment and in order
have all the facts, we will relate them as

The parties were married at Reno, Nevada, September
9, 1947. In 1949, following a short residence in Texas
where their first child was born, the parties moved to
Salt Lake City, Utah, where they purchased a home and
appellant engaged in business. Their second child was
born in Salt Lake City in December, 1949. At the time
of the divorce hearing appellant was the owner and
operator of three business entities, all located in Salt Lake
City, Utah. The parties lived continuously in Utah from
1949 until shortly after their divorce.

Divorce Action In Utah
On October 3, 1958, Judge Aldon J. Anderson of
the Third Judicial District, State of Utah issued a divorce
after finding the appellant guilty of extreme cruelty, and
awarded custody rights to the respondent with visitation
rights to appellant. With respect to the property and the
maintenance of respondent and the children, the court
found that respondent's enterprises gave him an earning
capacity of $8,550.00 per year, awarded all business assets
to the appellant and ordered him to pay $200 per month
child support and $175.00 per month alimony. The proceeds of the sale of the family residence in Salt Lake City
were divided equally between the pairtie s; reslpondent
1

2

was award what remained of the household furniture;
appellant received the family automobile. Savings in the
form of insurance on appellant's life were confirmed to
appellant "leaving to his discretion the beneficiaries thereof, with the admonition, nevertheless, to keep in mind
his said children as said beneficiaries." Finally the court
fo11nd it fair and equitable that the land in California be
divided in kind, one-half to remain the property of
U])pellant and one-half to be conveyed by appellant to
respondent, in tJ'ust, for the use and benefit of the children.
The original decree provided, paragraph 7 and
8 thereof, that appellant convey the south 1/2 of
lots 1 and 3, block 16, of Fair Oaks tract, consisting
of approximately 20 1/2 acres of certain California
property to the respondent in trust for the children
to cover their support and education during their
minority. The respondent to convey the property
or balance thereof remaining to the children when
the youngest attains or would have attained the
age of 18. (R. 68)
Appell,ant moved thereafter for modification of the
divorce decree.

Following entry of the decree on October 3, 1958,
appellant moved the court to modify the original decree
and to substitute the north one-half instead of the south
one-half. The result was an order under date of December
17, 1958 which modified the decree of October 3, 1958,
substituting the north one-half for the south one-half.
All other portions of the decree were affirmed. (R. 73, 74)
Events fallowing the divorce decree.
1. The appellant refused to convey said California
3

real property as ordered by the court and was ordered
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court. (R. 78) The appellant thereafter on the 23rd day
of February, 1961 was held in contempt of Court. (R. 95)
2. The appellant refused to pay alimony and child
support payments as ordered and as of the 3rd day of
January 1961, past due alimony and child support totaled
the sum of $5,425. (R. 81)
3. The appellant attempted to circumvent and thwart
lawful court orders by purportedly disposing of his Utah
business interests to one M. R. Morrison of Salt Lake
City, Utah, who thereafter immediately sold said business
interests to the Industrial Real Estate and Finance Co.,
for the amount of $61,296.73. (R. 93)
4. The appellant was held to be in contempt of the
court by reason of his failure to pay alimony and support
money as ordered. (R. 93)
5. A receiver was appointed by the court on February
23, 1961 to insure the respondent's receipt of alimony
and support payments ordered to be paid and to receive
and disburse payments from the sale of the business
interests of the appellant. (R. 97)

Other important facts concerning the Utah decree.
1. The appellant was present throughout the trial

and was represented by legal counsel. The appellant had
an opportunity to appeal the trial court's decision but the
appellant did not appeal. (R. 57)
2. The appellant following the qivorce decree re·
quested the court to substitute the north half for the
4

:->onth half which was granted. Thus further substantiating
tllc fact that it \Vas the appellant who requested the trial
nrnrt to transfer the California property in trust for his
minor children .
3. The court recalled that it was the determination
of the court on October 3, 1958 the date of the original
divorce decree, to award to the respondent one-half of
said California real property as her separate property
rmd that the provision for award to the respondent was
so intended. (R. 201)
"The court checked its memory with Mr.
Gustin and Mr. Baldwin, former attorneys for the
plaintiff and defendant respectively, and the court
feels correct that this suggestion to award the
property to the respondent in trust for the minor
children did not come from the court, but came
from counsel. That was a provision of the divorce
decree that was reached after consultation with
counsel and was not a provision reached individually
by the court. The court points out that Mr. Farley
was before the court physically and concurred in
the prnperty division and the restrictions which
were placed upon the property intended to be awarded to Mrs. Farley, the plaintiff (respondent) and
ivere placed there at his (appellant) request to
insure the use of the property for the benefit of the
minor children." (R. 201)
Subsequent to the issuance of the decree of October
3 1958 both of the parties moved to the state of California.
'
'
On June 18, 1959, the Respondent filed an action in the
Superior Court of the state of California in and for the
county of Sacramento seeking to do the following:
5

"For an order and decree declaring and adjudging that Plaintiff, as trustee for Ross Edward
Farley, II and Barbara Susanne Farley, is the owner
of said real property described in said order modifying decree dated December 17, 1958, and described
in paragraph V of plaintiff's first stated Cause of
Action and that Defendants, or any of them, have
no right, title, estate or interest whatever in or to
said real property, and that Def end ants, and all oi
them, be forever debarred from asserting any claim
whatsoever in or to said real property adverse to
the Plaintiff" (Page 7 of Ex. D-5).

In effect to quiet title in herself as trustee.
On August 11, 1959, Appellant filed an action in the
same California court seeking the following:
1. To quiet title to the same California property which
is here in dispute (see page 82 Ex. D-5)

2. To reduce alinwny and child support paynients
Provided by the Utah Court (see page 37 of Ex. D-5).
The California trial court confirmed the divorce decree
with the exception of paragraphs 7 and 8, which provided
for the trust as described above and quieted Appellant's
title in the real property subject to a lien upon said real
property for alimony and child support (See Ex. G). This
decree was in turn appealed to the District Court of
Appeal in and for the Third Appellate District for the
State of California. The opinion of the California appellate
court is included as EX. B in the Record and might be
summarized as follows:
(a) The conveyance of the real property in trust,
during the minority of the children, was properly within
6

the Utah Court's jurisdiction and could not be collaterally
atlacked in the Courts of California.
(b) The further provision in the Utah decree which
provided that upon the children's reaching their majority,
the property would be distributed to them, was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Utah Court and was thus subject to
collateral attack in the State of California. In this regard,
the Court noted :
"We conclude that the award (Judge Anderson's October, 1958 Decree) exceeds the jurisdiction
of the Utah Court to the extent that it decrees
transfer of property or money to the children when
they reach adulthood. The lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the Utah decree."
The final portion of the California decision concluded:
"\Ve conclude that the Utah decree, so far as
it directed conveyance of the land, its proceeds or
income, to the Defendant's children upon their
reaching adulthood, exceeds the jurisdiotion of the
Utah court, that it is vulnerable to collateral attack
in Utah and not entitled to full faith and credit in
California" (See pp. 6 and 10 of Ex. D-4).
In accordance with the appellate court's decision, the
California trial court, upon remand of the case, issued a
modified decr~e ~nd judg<r.cnt which provided in essence
that the Appellant must forthwith convey the real property
in trust to the Respondent for the benefit of the minor
children during their minority. Appellant executed such a
deed on May 28, 1965 (Ex. D-11). The decree also provided
that after the children had reached their majority (in
December of 1967), the trust should terminate and the
Hespondent should reconvey the property, or its remaining
proceeds to the Appellant as his sole and separate property
(See Ex. D-12).
7

The net effect of the California litigation, therefore,
was simply to grant a vested remainder in the trust
property to the Appellant, after the children had reached
their majority.
Subsequent Utah Litigation.
It should be noted that it was the Appellant and not
the Respondent who returned to the Utah field of battle.
The Appellant, Mr. Farley having iu~lfully refused to
comply with lawful court orders issued by the Utah Court
still requested on March 11, 1965 for the Utah Court to
give full faith and credit to the California Courts and to
reduce alimony payments from $175 to $100. ( R. 156)

The Utah court, after a hearing held on March 18,
1965, gave full faith and credit to the California decree
and accordingly on the 22nd day of March, 1965 reduced
Appellant's alimony payments from $175 to $100. (R. 177)
The respondent in response to appellant's motion
and notice requested the court also on March 11th 1965
to modify its original decree (R. 164) and to award to
the respondent as her separate property the north one-half
of the California property. (R. 164)
The respondent's motion to award the disputed onehalf of the California property to here self in fee simple
was first heard together with the appellants motion to
reduce alimony on March 18, 1965 (R. 166). Respondent's
motion was then continued until April 16, 1958, at which
time the district court heard further argument and re·
ceived memorandums from both sides. The hearing was
further continued to May 12, 1965 with direction for
counsel for both sides to submit further memorandums
8
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and authorities and to examine the California transcript
and records in order to determine whether the respondent's motion had been submitted to the California courts
an<l was therefore res judicata. (R. 190) The court continued the hearing again until June 18, 1965 for further
argument. The court further considered the matter at a
hearing held on January 5, 1966, where counsel for both
sides again presented arguments. The outcome of the
January 5th 1966 hearing was an order signed by Judge
Aldon J. Anderson on the 27th day of January, 1966
awarding the disputed one..:half of the California property
to the respondent in fee simple as her separate property
following the termination of the trust. (R. 205) The judge
also concluded that as the trial judge at the time of the
original hearing that was his intent and determination at
that time and that he would then have s·o awarded the
disputed property except for the appellant's request that
the property be awarded in trust for his minor children.
(R.201)
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER
COURT
After approximately one year, five hearings, four
written memorandums ( 2 from each side), and several
hours of oral argument Judge Aldon J. Anderson granted
the one-half of the California property in dispute to the
respondent in fee simple as her separate property. Order
dated January 27, 1966, (R. 195, R. 200)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE NEVER CON9

SIDERED A REQUEST THAT THE DISPUTIW
ONE-HALF OF THE CALIFORNIA PROPERTY BR
A WARDED TO THE RESPONDENT IN FEE AS
HER SEPARATE PROPERTY. THE MATTER IS
NOT RES JUDICATA.
The appellant requested the California court for the
following:
1. Quiet title to the one-half of the California property in dispute. (see page 87 D-5)
2. Reduce child support to $35.00 per month ancl
eliminate alimony payments. (see page 31 Ex. D-5)

The respondent requested the California Court:
1. To quiet title to the one-half of the California
property in dispute in herself as trustee for the minor

children.

The Utah court considered a request that the disputed
property be awarded to the respondent in fee as her
separate property.

The appellant now by s01ne magical and metamorphical nieans wants to convert a quiet title action into an
adjudication of marital property rights.
The sole question before the California courts was
the question of the validity of the Utah decree. At no time
did it consider a request that the disputed California
property be granted to the respondent as her separate
property.
The Utah Court by its order of April 21, 1965 directed
the appellant to produce evidence:
10

"Whether the California courts heard evidence
and considered a request from the Plaintiff Barbara
Ann Farley, to have that portion of the California
property tr an sferred in trust .. trans/ erred directly
to her as her separate property." (R. 190)
It is interesting to note that the appellant has produced

evidence that the California courts considered that
<1uestion in either of his two memorandums submitted to
Judge Anderson. (see R. 182 and R. 209) The appellant
claims that mere common sense compels the conclusion
that a quiet title action is an action to litigate marital
property rights. Common sense leads me to the conclusion
that the guilty party to a marriage, one who has consistently refused to show any good faith and who is in
contempt of the Utah court should not becaus·e of legal
maneuvers retain all marital property when the wife and
tu.·o children have nothing.
110

The Honorable, Aldon J. Anderson, carefully considered the problem of res judicata and requested the
appellant to show evidence that the matter had been considered in California. The appellant was in possession of
a complete transcript of the California trial court proceedings and all other records (supplied by the respondent)
and the only argument advanced then and now was the
argument that a quiet tit!e action ·was someho\V magically
a litigation of the respondent's marital property rights.
The California courts
of the Utah decree.

m~erely

considered the validity

It would appear that Judge Anderson correctly con-

cluded the matter had not been litigated in the California
court and was not there/ ore res iudicata.
11

The full faith and credit clause is therefore not an
issue and quite easily side stepped the matter entirely when
courts were not disturbed by the full faith and credU
issue and quite easily side steped the matter entirely when
the respondent asked for enforcement of her Utah divorce
decree.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AW ARD ING
THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE TO
THE PLAINTIFF.
SECTION 30-3-5. U.C.A. (1953)
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND CHILDREN
"When a decree of divorce is made the court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property, and parties and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable : provided,
that if any of the children have attained the age of
ten years and are of sound mind, such children
shall have the privilege of selecting the parent to
which they will attach themselves. Such subsequent
changes or new orders may be made by the court
with respect to the disposal of the children or the
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable
and proper."
This statute, which has existed in substantially the
same language since 1888, constitutes the entire statutory
law of Utah on the subject of the powers and duties of the
chancellor in rendering a divorce decree.
The leading case of MURPHY v. MOYLE, 17 Utah
113, 53 Pac 1010, cited by the California Appellant Court,

12

interpretes the above statute as a broad grant of discretion
to both the trial and appellate courts of Utah to make
such orders with respect to the property of the parties and
their furture support as are dictated by equitable considerations. See also Matei v. Mattei, 12 Utah 2nd 116, 363
T'ar. 2d 779.
Murphy v. Moyle, cited above states:
"This statute is broad and comprehensive.
Under it the Court has power to make such a decree
if the circumstances may warrant, and doubtless,
if there is danger of the father squandering the
estate, or if, from hostility or other cause, he is
likely to refuse maintenance to his wife, or support
to his children awarded to her, and thus leave the
children to be supported by the mother without the
aid from his estate, the court may make such order
respecting the property and the support and maintenance of the wife and children, as is just and
equitable, and such order or decree may be made to
continue in force after his decease; and the court
may afterwards, if occasion shall require it, make
such change in any decrees as will be conducive to
the best interests of all parties concerned."
A more recent expression of the interpretation placed

upon this statute is found in the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Crocker in Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237,
8,12 Pac. 2d 103.
Page 242
"In regard to these matters the court is endowed with powers over property and persons far
broader than in any other type of civil action. It
may make such disposition of the property and
impose such controls upon their persons as it deems
necessary for their welfare."

13

The last sentence of Section 30-3-5 "RETAINS JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE DECREE,
INCLUDING THE PROPERTY DIVISION ASPECT
THEREOF, UPON A SHOWING OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES."

See also Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 Pac. 2d
1211 wherein the court provided that changes could be
made regarding the property division upon a showing of
changed circumstances.
If circumstances warrant, to secure future support

the court may impress a lien upon the husband's property
(Murphy v. Moyle, supra), or require that the awarded
property be held in trust, (Doe v. Doe 48 Utah 200, 213,
158 Pac. 781.)
Pursuant to the grant of jurisdiction, divorce courts
in Utah customarily award the wife at least one third of
the husband's estate, Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 109;
55 Pac. 84; Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 Pac. 2d
743.

Appellant's arguments summarize.
(a) The California property in dispute was not part
of the original property settlement and therefore there
can be no modification (page 14 appellant's brief)
(b) Section 30-3-5. UCA allows the modification of
a property settlement in only the most extreme and
unusual circumstances. (page 16 appellant's brief)
Basically the cases cited by the appellant are the
same cases cited by respondent but the appellant draws
different conclusions.
14

As to point (a) the appellant CONTRADICTS HIMSELF on page H he argues the disputed California property was not part of the property settlement and then
he cites Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d
914 (1953) where he states the court was faced with an
identical problem to that here: "Whether or not a property settlement incorporated in a divorce decree can be
subsequently modified."
See the original decree dated October 3, 1958, (R. 65)
the modifying order of the original decree dated 16th day
of December, 1958. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of law connected therewith, and the Finding of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 201) where in all cases the court
discusses in detail the marital property and provides for
distribution of the property. It v,rould appear that the
facts and pleadings clearly show the disputed property to
!Je part of the property settlement. In all cases it is listed
as part of the marital property.
Point ( b) A property settlenient may be modified
only in the most extreme and unusual circumstances and
the appellant concludes they do not exist here. (appellant's
brief page 16)

The record shows:
(A) The appellant was the guilty party in the
marriage. ( R. 65)
(B) Held in contempt of court for failing to pay
alimony and child support. At times the amount in
arrears exceeded $5,000 dollars. (R. 93) (R. 81)

( C) Attempted to dispose of his business interests
for an amount in excess of $61,000 in such a way
as to avoid child support and alimony payments
(R. 93)

15

( D) Held in contempt of court for refusing to
convey the disputed one-half of the California
property to respondent in trust. ( R. 93)
(E) Appellant physically in court throughout the
divorce proceedings and represented by counsel.

The appellant requested the court to award onehalf of the California property to the respondent
in trust for the rninor children. (R. 57) (R. 201)
(F) The appellant has displayed throughout a
complete disregard for lawful court orders and
contempt for the court. ( R. 93)
( G) The respondent and her two children have
shared in no marital property except approximately
$1,756 from the sale of the personal residence
(R. 60) and the household furniture. (R. 60)
(H) Appellant has attempted to eleminate alimony
payments and reduce child support payments to
$35 per child.
(I) The appellant went "shopping" to the California
courts for a better decision after requesting the
Utah courts to do what it did. (R. 201) (page 87
D-5)
(J) The California property consisting of 41 acres
at Fair Oakes, Sacramento, is believed to have a
value of approximately $5,000 per acre, total approximate value $200,000 (minimum).

To summarize: the guilty party to the marriage by
legal maneuvers and court shopping has managed to
receive all of the marital property, while displaying a
contempt and a wilful intent to refuse to pay alimony and
support payments. What future financial protection will

this family have or receive from the appellant?
16

The respondent believes that extreme and unusual
circurnstances e:i.:iS't here and that the Utah courts have
been thwarted in their attempt to provide for a fair,
equitable, just settlement of marital property by the
appellant's contemptuous conduct and "court shopping"
tactics.
POINT III.
CALIFORNIA LAW SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED
BY UTAH IN PROVIDING FOR A MARITAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT OR MODIFICATION
THEREOF.
Even the California Courts would not agree with
appellants argument (appellant's brief page 26) that the
conflicts of law rule provides that the situs of the real
property must be followed even in divorce actions.
The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of the
State of California, in and for the Third Appellant District,
(Ex. D-4 page 4, 5) states:
"In the present case both husband and wife
were bona fide residents of Utah and both fully
participated in the Utah action. Thus the courts
of that state had fundamental jurisdiction over the
parties' martial status and their persons. (Sherrer
V. Sherrer, supra, 334 U.S. at pp. 350-351, Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-230; Crouch
v. Crouch, 28 Cal 2nd 243, 249 - 250; Rest., Conflicts
of Laws, sec. 110; Rest., Judgments, secs. 16, 33.)
The husband cannot now question Utah's juri,sdiction
over the subject matter and parties.

17

"Utah is not a community property state. In
dividing assets between a divorcing husband and
wife, Utah courts niay award property acquired
before converture. (Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255
(67 P. 2d 265, 267). Section 30-3-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, empowers a divorce court to
"make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable." Utah
statutes characterize this statute as broad and
comprehensive, authorizing such decree as the circumstances may warrant, including provisions for
the support of children during their minority.
(Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113 (53 Pac. 1010,
1012) ; see also Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2nd 34
(261 p. 2d 944.) The Murphy decision specifically
upholds a decree directing S'ale of the husband's land
and deposit of the proceeds with the court clerk
with directions to pay the wife a fixed monthly
sum for support of the minor children. In order to
insure payment of future alimony (and inferentially
to secure support of minor children), a husband
may be enjoined from disposing of his property.
(Anderson v. Anderson, 54 Utah 309 (181 Pac. 168.)
The California Court would permit Utah to apply
Utah law in divorce actions as the above shows assuming
Utah to have jurisdiction over the parties. In Utah the
law provides for continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions.
It should also be remembered that the appellant returned
to the Utah field of battle in order to have alimony reduced
from $175 per month to $100 per rnonth. In response to
that petition the respondent requested that the disputed
one-half of the California real property be awarded to her
as her separate property.
18

The broad conflict of law rule cited by the appellant
does not here apply. Utah has jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter and may apply Utah law in divorce
matters or subsequent modifications.

POINT IV.
THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
SUBSEQUENT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN ORDER TO·PROVIDE
FOR MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE.
The appellant (appellant's brief page 23) argues that
the trial court must modify a previous decree only upon
r1 showing of change in circumstances.
The appellant by this argument hopes to provide for
"judicial blindness" and to preclude the Utah Courts from
giving judicial recognition to actions by the California
Courts nullifying the decree of the Utah Courts.

Nothing is taken from the appellant and nothing has
been changed. The appellant agreed and in fact requested
the Utah Court to award the one-half of the California
property to the respondent in trust for the minor children,
(R. 201) then fled to California to shop for a better forum
and tdle to the property has been in dispute ever since.
As the California Court so effectively argues (D-4)
page 9)
"Under the particular facts here defendent's
failure to appel (in Utah) does not bar him. (In
California). Mrs. Farley suffered no change of
position as a result of that failure." (page 9 D-4)

19

Title to the one-half portion of the California property has always been in dispute. The modification order
in no way changes the amount to be distributed to Mr.
Farley under the terms of the divorce decree. (R. 65)
The modification order merely does what was originally intended to be done and to permit a equitable, fair,
settlement of marital property. (R. 65, R. 201) Mr. Farley
under the terms of the original decree received one-half
of all marital real property in addition he was awarded
as his separate property his business and life insurance
policies. The modification decree does not decreas'e the
amount Mr. Farley was to receive under the terms of the
original decree in any way.
The modification order merely carries out the intent
of the trial judge to make a fair equitable settlement of
marital property.

Mr. Farley's position has not been changed his share
of marital property has not been reduced.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND RESPONDENT'S MOTION SHOULD NOT BE
DISMISSED ON TH~ GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS.
The appellant, Mr. Farley, voluntarily returned to the
Utah battle field. He voluntarily filed on March 11th 1965
a motion to reduce alimony payments from $175 dollars
per month to $100 per month. (R. 155) A hearing was
held on March 18th, 1965 and an order signed by the
Court on March 22, 1965 wherein alimony was reduced
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from $175 dollars per month to $100 dollars per month.
(R. 177)

The respondent properly noticed and motioned, the
Court in response to appellants motion that the one-half
portion of the California property in dispute be awarded
to her as her separate property. The first hearing on
respondent's motion was held on March 18, 1965, the same
date aS' appellant's motion to reduce alimony. (R. 166) The
respondent's motion was finally decided in her favor on
January 22, 1966.
The respondent respectfully points out to the Court
that the appellant returned to the Utah battle field voluntarily as a result of his own nwtion and having succeeded in
striking his blow dances around the ring and cries forum
non conveniens.

I can but you can't
For me it's convenient
For you - forum non conveniens.
Certainly the State of Utah and its judiciary should
be concerned with this action, in order to prevent a grave
miscarriage of justice. Utah attempted to provide a fair,
equitable settlement of marital property, yet by legal
maneuvers, wilful disregard and contemptuous conduct
the appellant, the guilty party to the marriage, retained
all marital property, while the respondent and her two
minor children fought to obtain alimony and child support.
CONCLUSION
The appellant relies heavily on the case of Smith v.
Smith, 77 Utah 60, 68, 291 Pac. 298 (1930). It is cited on
page 9, 10, 12 and 20 (appellant's brief) and also in his
l'onclusion. The Smith case involves a North Dakota divorce
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where the property rights were completely litigated in
North Dakota.
The present case involves a Utah divorce frustrated
by the appellant and a voluntary return to Utah by both
parties to request Utah, the jurisdiction of the divorce,
to provide for a fair, equitable, just, division of marital
property as the Court originally intended. The two cases
clearly are not similar and the Smith case should not
support appellant's arguments.
The respondent respectfully requests this court to
affirm carefully considered opinion of Judge Anderson and
to permit a fair equitable division of marital property.
If for any reason that cannot be accomplished respondent respectfully requests the court to affirm paragraph 9 of the order dated January 27, 1966 (R. 204)
wherein it is provided:
"If for any reason the conveyance of the
North half of Lots 1 and 3, Block 16, Fair Oaks
Tract, according to the official plat thereof filed
in the office of the Recorder of Sacramento County,
California, to the plaintiff is not permitted by the
California Courts, then the defendent is hereby
ordered to pay to the plaintiff a sum of money
equal to the appraised value of the north one-half
of said property, as of the date of October 3, 1958,
the date of the original decree. If the parties
cannot agree on an appraised value then the court
shall appoint a competent real estate appraiser to
determine the value of said property as of the 3rd
day of October, 1958" (R. 204)

Respectfully submitted,
PA UL M. HANSEN
Attorney for Respondent
817 Oak Dr.
South Ogden, Utah
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